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Abstract 
This paper analyses the distribution of power among ministers during David 
Cameron’s premiership. More specifically, it reports both the application of 
Dunleavy’s measures of positional influence to successive lists of cabinet committees 
and our efforts validate them by drawing on insider feedback. It charts how the 
cabinet-committee system changed between 2010 and 2016, and interprets successive 
rankings of ministerial influence. It further investigates the nature of power in 
Cameron’s governments by detailing a number of former ministers’ responses to our 
measures. Those we spoke to were generally sceptical of the importance of cabinet 
committees and especially of our attempts to derive measures of ministerial influence 
from them. Overall, our findings emphasise the dangers of attributing too much 
importance to formal structures and instead draw attention to how contemporary core-
executive politics are shaped by informal networks and structures. 
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Introduction 
Empirical research rarely goes according to plan. Evidence is often only partly 
consistent with expectations, and sometimes it entirely contradicts them. This paper 
reports findings that fall into the second category. We set out hoping to validate 
Dunleavy’s (1995; 2003) measures of ‘positional-influence’, a way of scoring 
ministers’ intra-executive power on the basis of cabinet-committee memberships, by 
speaking to former ministers and officials. But instead of confirming the measures’ 
validity, the feedback we received strongly cautioned against them. In the words of 
one former minister, there was ‘a charming naivety to this idea [but] at some point, 
the gain in transparency and objectivity is outweighed by falsehood’ (interviewee, 2). 
Our engagement with Dunleavy’s measures was prompted by their relevance 
to our immediate interest in the formal structures and informal dynamics of power in 
David Cameron’s governments. Cameron’s premiership was remarkable by any 
account. He led the first peace-time coalition since the 1930s and the first single-party 
Tory government since 1992 (see Hazell and Yong, 2012; d’Ancona, 2013; Bennister 
and Heffernan, 2014; Riddell, 2015; Byrne et al., 2016; Dorey and Garnett, 2016; 
Seldon and Snowdon, 2016). He was also the first British prime minister to leave 
office as a result of calling and then losing a referendum (Smith, 2018). With early 
accounts of his premiership suggesting a revival of cabinet committees as decision-
making arenas (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 53-55; d’Ancona, 2013: 37; Dorey and 
Garnett, 2016: 37-38), there was a clear rationale for using the measures to examine 
changing power relations among his ministers. 
At the same time, our engagement with Dunleavy’s measures was also driven 
by their potential broader utility. The relative standing of prime ministers and other 
senior ministers can have an enormous effect on government cohesion and unity, on 
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policy decisions, and on a government’s broader political fortunes. But if we are to 
relate power dynamics to such outcomes, we first need accurately to describe or 
measure them. Unfortunately, there are few options available for political scientists 
wishing to do this. Most indices of governmental power or authority tend to focus on 
single actors in the core executive, usually prime ministers (Bennister et al., 2015; 
O’Malley, 2007). Dunleavy’s approach, by contrast, offers a way to measure 
influence consistently and systematically among all ministers. Over two decades since 
they were first proposed, his ‘wonderfully innovative’ measures remain a rare 
example of ‘rigorous positivism’ in core-executive studies (Elgie, 2011: 74). They 
deserve to be taken seriously. 
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. Its principal 
contribution is as a methodological case-study of using insiders as ‘co-researchers’ 
(James, 2018) to validate measures, in this instance positional-influence scores 
derived from cabinet committees. To this end, we first applied Dunleavy’s measures 
to successive lists of committees covering the entirety of Cameron’s premiership, 
relating our findings, where appropriate, to a range of other sources, including 
memoirs, newspaper reports and other insider accounts. We then elicited direct 
feedback on the results from former ministers and officials in Cameron’s 
governments, either in the form of face-to-face interviews or via correspondence. The 
paper’s secondary contribution, which stems from its first, is to shed light on how 
Cameron organised and used the institutions of collective decision-making. Existing 
accounts have tended to focus on the early years of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition (Hazell and Yong, 2012; Dorey and Garnett, 2016), but this paper 
covers the whole of Cameron’s premiership. In the process, it further contributes to 
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our knowledge and understanding of cabinet committees in contemporary British 
government. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews 
Dunleavy’s measures, while the third section reports our application of them to 
Cameron’s governments. The fourth section reflects on issues of validity and our use 
of insiders as co-researchers. The fifth section summarises the feedback we received 
and our respondents’ general scepticism towards the measures. It also reports 
respondents’ wider views about cabinet committees and the nature of power in British 
central government. The final section discusses the implications of our findings, both 
in terms of measuring power in Britain’s core executive and the wider analytical value 
of studying cabinet committees. 
  
Power and influence in cabinet committees 
The starting point for our research was Dunleavy’s (1995; 2003) innovative 
framework for analysing ministers’ influence in government on the basis of their 
memberships of cabinet committees. Cabinet committees have long been a feature of 
British government, bringing together smaller groups of ministers to prepare or 
formally approve policy (Gordon Walker, 1972; Hennessy, 1986; Burch and Holliday, 
1996; Cattrall and Brady, 1998). Yet, their work was shrouded in official secrecy until 
1992, when John Major established the practice of publishing their names, remits and 
memberships. Dunleavy (1995: 303-304) used this information to assess 
systematically the distribution of influence over collective decision-making within the 
committee system. The underlying logic was summarised in a follow-up study of 
power in Tony Blair’s government: ‘Policy making inside government is like a lottery 
process in one small respect – you have to be in it to win it’ (Dunleavy, 2003: 343).  
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Deriving measures of ministerial influence from cabinet committees was a 
two-step affair. The first step was to identify the relative importance of every 
committee in the system. To do this, Dunleavy (1995: 306) calculated a ‘weighted 
influence score’ for each committee, which reflected its status as either a full 
committee or a sub-committee (full committees were assumed to carry twice the 
weighted influence of sub-committees), and the proportion of its members who were 
full cabinet ministers (the higher the proportion, the more important the committee). 
The calculation was based on a simple formula: 100 * S * (C/N), where S was the 
official status of a committee (full committees scored 1, and sub-committees scored 
0.5), C was the number of cabinet-level members and N was the total membership. 
The second step was to divide this score among the committee’s members. 
Every member received an equal share except for the chair, who received a double 
share (Dunleavy, 1995: 307).1 Individual ministers’ shares of all weighted scores were 
then aggregated, creating a single composite score for every minister that could be 
expressed as a percentage of the sum of all ministers’ scores across all committees. 
Dunleavy’s initial study, which focused on Major’s government in 1992, 
showed the prime minister to have the highest share of positional influence. The next 
most influential ministers were the foreign secretary, defence secretary and chancellor 
of the exchequer (Dunleavy, 1995: 308-309). His follow-up study of Tony Blair’s 
government in 2001 revealed a decline in the prime minister’s overall share of 
positional influence in the cabinet-committee system (Dunleavy, 2003). Meanwhile, a 
later study of the 2010 coalition government, using the same method, suggested a 
further decline in the prime minister’s influence (Royal Holloway Group PR3710, 
2012). It also suggested the Liberal Democrats enjoyed disproportionately greater 
influence than their ministerial representation in the government. 
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Like many innovative approaches, Dunleavy’s has its detractors. One criticism 
concerns its imprecise conceptualisation of influence (James, 1999: 63). Ministers 
might have broad strategic influence, or they might exert influence over very specific 
decisions. Both can be important, but they are very different things. 
A second criticism concerns the use of committee memberships to measure 
ministerial influence (Catterall and Brady, 1998: 74). There has always been variation 
in how committees function in practice. Under Blair, for example, there was a general 
downgrading in their importance as ‘sofa government’ replaced cabinet government. 
Key decisions were often made in informal gatherings, while committees were 
characterised as ‘hollow shells’ (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 50). More generally, 
committees have tended to function as deliberative decision-making bodies only when 
prime ministers have wanted them to (Catterall and Brady, 1998: 76). Power and 
influence, in other words, are exogenous to the cabinet-committee system. Using 
committees to measure influence confuses cause and effect.  
In fairness, Dunleavy was open about the measures’ limitations, as well as the 
assumptions on which they were based. He recognised that there were other decision 
arenas in government, and a great deal could be agreed in advance in discussions 
between key departments or in bilateral meetings between spending departments and 
the Treasury or Downing Street: ‘but at some stage all the threads of these diverse 
forms of discussions have to run together in a Cabinet Committee decision’ 
(Dunleavy, 2003: 344). Even under Blair, committees continued to ratify decisions 
and confer collective authority upon them, structure inter-departmental relations and 
provide a mechanism for departments to clear policies, and even occasionally allow 
ministers to meet, share information and talk politics. Dunleavy was also clear, as he 
put it, that the scores ‘should not be fetishised, nor should any fine or precise 
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significance be attached to them’. Rather, they were a ‘heuristic’ and served as ‘pegs 
which help us to think further about the ways cabinet committees and ministerial 
influence over decision making can be patterned’ (Dunleavy, 1995: 319-320). In this 
respect, the scores had the great virtue of reliability: they opened up the possibility for 
undertaking systematic comparisons over time. 
 
Structure and influence in Cameron’s committee system 
Any analysis of cabinet committees and ministerial influence in David Cameron’s 
governments must begin by recognising that his was a premiership of two halves. 
Between 2010 and 2015, he headed a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. From 
the 2015 general election until just after the June 2016 Brexit referendum, he led a 
single-party Conservative government. These different circumstances placed different 
demands on the cabinet-committee system and affected its organisation and structure. 
Before he became prime minister, Cameron had talked about wanting to 
restore ‘cabinet government’ and the institutions of collective decision-making 
(Clarke, 2016: 460). Following the outcome of the 2010 general election, he had an 
added incentive to do so. For Cameron and Liberal Democrat deputy prime minister 
Nick Clegg, cabinet committees were an obvious means to manage inter-party 
relations and ‘coalitionise’ policy (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 53-55; d’Ancona, 2013: 
37; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 37-38). Cheered on by civil servants, who wished to 
restore more orderly decision-making (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 51), the Coalition 
Agreement for Stability and Reform committed the new government to making ‘full 
use’ of the committee system to deliver collective responsibility (Cabinet Office, 
2010: 3).  
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The result was a slimmed-down committee system, first unveiled in May 2010 
(see Figure 1). It comprised three types of committee. The first and most important of 
these were the standing policy committees, which included the National Security 
Council (NSC), the Home Affairs Committee, the Economic Affairs Committee, the 
Social Justice Committee and the European Affairs Committee. These were 
permanent features of the committee system, had wide remits and coordinated major 
areas of policy. The second type was the policy sub-committee, usually a smaller body 
with a narrower remit that nominally reported to one of the standing committees, such 
as the NSC’s Nuclear Deterrence and Security Sub-Committee.  
 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
The third type was what might be called ‘staff’ committees, bodies that were 
created to help manage government business. They included the Parliamentary 
Business and Legislation Committee and the Coalition Committee, a body chaired 
jointly by Cameron and Clegg that was intended to act as a final court of appeal for 
inter-party disputes in other committees. They also included at this stage the Coalition 
Operation and Strategic Planning Group, an entity that was explicitly not a cabinet 
committee but which was intended to support the Coalition Committee. 
This initial configuration did not last. Some bodies were disbanded, and 
additional committees and sub-committees were established, usually in response to 
the changing agenda and press of events. In late 2012, for example, a Scotland 
Committee was established to prepare the government’s strategy for the planned 
Scottish independence referendum, while a Flooding Committee was established in 
early 2014 in response to that year’s winter floods. 
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After the 2015 general election, Cameron re-oriented the committee system to 
meet the demands of single-party government (see Figure 2). He retained the major 
standing policy committees but introduced several new committees, most notably the 
Europe Committee to prepare for the planned EU referendum. He also introduced an 
entirely new class of body, implementation task forces. These were not policy-making 
committees but ministerial groups responsible for monitoring and driving forward key 
cross-cutting policies (Letwin, 2018: 233-235).  
 
<<Figure 2 about here>> 
 
Taking a step back, Figure 3 draws on all the lists of committees published 
between May 2010 and April 2016 to chart how the committee system changed across 
Cameron’s premiership. It shows that the total number of committees proliferated 
after 2010. By June 2013, the mid-point of Cameron’s premiership, there were 28. 
The total number of committees also proliferated after the 2015 general election. The 
return to single-party government saw an initial cull in the number of committees and 
sub-committees, as well as the advent of a number of implementation task forces. By 
the end of Cameron’s premiership, the number of committees, sub-committees and 
task forces had all increased, taking the total number of all types to 31. 
 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
 
We now turn to our application of Dunleavy’s measures to Cameron’s 
governments. We made three minor adjustments to the measures in order to 
accommodate developments in the composition and organisation of cabinet 
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committees. First, when calculating a ‘weighted influence score’ for each committee, 
we counted as cabinet ministers all those who ‘attended cabinet’, as well as full 
members. This category of ministers has grown in recent years as prime ministers 
have sought to confer ‘cabinet status’ more widely.2 Second, we assumed that 
implementation taskforces had the same basic importance as sub-committees i.e. half 
the weight of full committees on the basis of their narrower remits.3 Third, while 
chairs and co-chairs alike earned a double share of each committee’s weighted score, 
deputy chairs and co-deputy chairs earned a share and a half. The role of deputy chair 
was central to the coalition government: all committees had a chair from one party 
and a deputy chair from the other, each of whom could escalate decisions to the 
Coalition Committee if need be. This adjustment to Dunleavy’s measures recognised 
their importance. 
Table 1 reports the resulting standardised scores of the 20 most influential 
ministers at the beginning of Cameron’s premiership in May 2010 and after three 
extensive cabinet reshuffles: in October 2012, December 2014 and July 2015.4 The 
chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, accrued the highest share of influence 
at all points between the 2010 and 2015 general elections, and the second highest 
share in 2015. Another notable high-scorer throughout Cameron’s premiership was 
Oliver Letwin, first as a minister of state in the Cabinet Office, and later as chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster. 
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
Cameron, meanwhile, never ranked higher than third, and had only the fifth 
highest score in 2012. During the period of coalition government, Nick Clegg was 
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initially placed second, before moving further down the rankings. In 2012, his score 
was lower than that of two other Liberal Democrats, the chief secretary to the 
Treasury, Danny Alexander, and business secretary, Vince Cable. Of the two other so-
called ‘great offices state’, the home secretary, Theresa May, was outside the top ten 
until 2015, when she was ranked third, while the foreign secretary’s highest ranking 
was fourth and usually much lower. 
If we follow Dunleavy’s (1995: 319) counsel about not attaching ‘precise 
significance’ to the measures, the scores seem to have some value. They highlight, for 
instance, the strategic influence of Osborne throughout the whole of Cameron’s 
premiership, and also the prominence of Letwin, the government’s policy-fixer in 
chief (Rentoul, 2015). A behind-the-scenes minister, it was Letwin’s job to ensure that 
decisions were consistent with Cameron’s preferences. From a Liberal Democrat 
perspective during the period of coalition government, the scores also highlight the 
reputed influence of Danny Alexander (Scottish secretary in 2010 and chief secretary 
to the Treasury in 2012 and 2014) and David Laws (chief secretary in 2010 and 
education minister in 2012 and 2014). Alexander and Laws were, in many respects, 
their party’s counterparts to Osborne and Letwin. Just as Cameron, Osborne, Clegg 
and Alexander constituted ‘the Quad’, a semi-formal grouping that effectively 
managed the coalition, so Letwin and Laws were in the next tier of seniority and 
joined them in ‘the sextet’ (Grice, 2012).  
The rankings also highlight Hague’s personal standing in the Cameron 
government between 2010 and 2015. A former Tory leader, Hague had notably more 
influence as foreign secretary (in 2010 and 2012) relative to Hammond (in 2014 and 
2015), and certainly more influence as leader of the House of Commons (in 2014) 
relative to his predecessors (Sir George Young in 2010 and Andrew Lansley in 2012) 
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and successor (Chris Grayling in 2015). Likewise, the scores accord with another 
former leader’s more limited standing in the government. Iain Duncan Smith was 
appointed as work and pensions secretary in May 2010, but was required to share the 
task of delivering welfare reform with Osborne. Osborne and Cameron almost 
governed as duumvirate and reportedly did not rate Duncan Smith all that highly 
(d’Ancona, 2013: 86-92). The latter’s measured influence placed him thirteenth, 
eighteenth, eighteenth and ninth respectively. 
 
Validity, value and realist interviews 
The scores and overall rankings we report undoubtedly bear some resemblance to 
previous accounts of Cameron’s government. In this sense, they appear to have some 
degree of ‘face validity’ (Bryman, 2016: 159). But how confident can we be that they 
adequately capture the concept of positional influence? After all, the scores’ practical 
value, even as heuristic ‘pegs’ for thinking about ministers’ intra-executive power, 
ultimately depend on their measurement validity (Adcock and Collier, 2001). If the 
scores end up providing a wholly misleading representation of who has influence, 
there is little point in employing them. Alternatively, if the goal is simply to produce a 
set of measures that serve as a starting point for thinking about intra-executive power, 
then simpler indicators, for instance the number of committees that ministers sit on, 
may serve just as well. Either way, the validity of the measures needs to be 
established. 
Following Adcock and Collier (2001: 531), measurement is valid when scores 
derived from indicators can be meaningfully interpreted in relation to a systematised 
concept. For our purposes, the key question is how far the scores can be interpreted 
meaningfully in terms of ministers’ influence in the committee system. In an ideal 
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world, we might pursue a strategy of what they term ‘convergent validation’ (Adcock 
and Collier, 2001: 540-542) by relating the scores to alternative indicators of 
influence, such as the number of new policies successfully proposed by each minister 
or successfully vetoed. The goal, of course, would be to infer the number of decisions 
made in line with ministers’ preferences. In practice, however, there are no readily 
available indicators. Because of official secrecy, we know very little even about how 
frequently committees meet, who actually attends them, how many papers are 
circulated or what positions ministers take on each item.5 
Instead we pursue a strategy of ‘content validation’ (Adcock and Collier, 
2001: 538-540) and seek to establish whether the positional-influence measures fully 
capture the nature of the cabinet-committee system during Cameron’s premiership. To 
this end, we sought feedback on the scores and measures from those who had expert 
knowledge of Cameron’s governments: former cabinet ministers and officials. We did 
so through a combination of face-to-face interviews and written correspondence. Our 
approach was thus consistent with what Pawson and Tilley (1997: 155) call ‘realistic 
interviews’: we used the respondents as ‘co-researchers’ to help us confirm, falsify or 
refine our measures, not as subjects of study in their own right (see also James, 2018).  
More specifically, we sought feedback on three particular aspects of Dunleavy’s 
measures: first, the assumptions surrounding the relative importance of committees 
and sub-committees and the plausibility of their weighted influence scores; second, 
the assumptions surrounding the division of committees’ influence scores, in 
particular the nominal equality of members and the special positions enjoyed by 
chairs and deputy chairs; and finally, the plausibility of the resulting scores. 
We approached a number of individuals with first-hand experience of cabinet-
level decision making between 2010 and 2016. In the event, we conducted four 
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anonymous semi-structured interviews.6 Three of those we spoke to agreed to 
participate in part because they were sympathetic to the basic premise of developing 
measures. In all cases, we discussed at length both the assumptions underpinning 
Dunleavy’s measures and the resulting scores and rankings as reported in Table 1. 
Because we had difficulty in convincing more former ministers to speak to us, we 
solicited additional feedback by correspondence. Altogether, we received written 
feedback from nine former cabinet ministers (out of 32 individuals contacted). They 
included eight Conservatives and one Liberal Democrat. Their anonymised comments 
constitute an invaluable source of data for assessing how insiders view influence in 
the cabinet-committee system and the validity of the positional-influence measures. 
 
Findings 
Committee influence scores 
The first aspect of Dunleavy’s measures on which we sought feedback related to the 
assumptions surrounding the calculation of committees’ weighted influence scores. 
Dunleavy assumed, not unreasonably, that committees varied in importance, partly on 
the basis of whether they were full committees or sub-committees and partly on the 
proportion of members who were of cabinet rank. Did former ministers agree? 
In one sense, there was some support for the underlying rationale: there was 
unanimous agreement that committees varied in importance. As one respondent 
wrote, ‘all committees are not equal’, and went on to point out that the Social Justice 
Committee’s Child Poverty Sub-Committee was obviously inferior to the National 
Security Council (NSC), which Cameron used to develop his thinking on foreign and 
security policy (correspondent, 5). Another told us that the Parliamentary Business 
and Legislation Committee, which reviewed legislation to determine its readiness for 
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Parliament, had more ‘“active” influence than, perhaps, a policy committee’ 
(correspondent, 8). But there was no support for the idea that the importance of 
committees could be calculated consistently on the basis of their membership or 
formal status. As one former minister told us, a sub-committee did not automatically 
carry half the weight of a full committee: this approach was ‘falsely precise’ 
(interviewee, 4). Some sub-committees were more important than full committees, 
notably the NSC sub-committees, which were ‘essentially the NSC minus one or two 
people’ (interviewee, 2). Similarly, another former minister could not recall ever 
convening a meeting of the sub-committee he chaired; its business was always 
covered in the main committee’s meetings (interviewee, 1).  
Two clear points emerged from the feedback. There was a clear pecking order 
of committees, and different committees were important in different ways. For 
instance, the NSC was consistently identified as the most important deliberative body. 
As one former minister told us, ‘there were genuine discussions, and the weight of 
opinion [in meetings] mattered, especially on issues that the prime minister was less 
certain about’ (interviewee, 2; see also Clarke, 2016: 465). The Home Affairs 
Committee too was reckoned by interviewees to have been ‘very important’ for 
discussion (interviewee, 1), at least during the early stages of the coalition 
government when it served as a key venue for ‘throat-clearing’ and managing inter-
party differences (interviewee, 4; see also Willetts, 2015). It most important role, 
however—which it performed exclusively after 2015—was to enable departments to 
clear policies via correspondence through the ‘write around’. Meanwhile, some 
committees focused ‘on matters of implementation rather than policy making’ 
(interviewee, 3) or ‘operational’ matters, monitoring decisions taken elsewhere 
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(interviewee, 4). It was not just the post-2015 implementation task forces that 
performed this role. 
Formal structures also missed informal importance. On paper, the Coalition 
Committee was arguably the most important body between 2010 and 2015 and served 
as a capstone to the committee system. But it met on only a few occasions, and its 
work was almost entirely superseded by the Quad (see Hazell and Yong, 2012: 53; 
d’Ancona, 2013: 36). Indeed, one respondent was ‘extremely cautious about using 
memberships of Cabinet Committees as any kind of proxy for “power”’, because ‘real 
decisions’ were generally made informally (correspondent, 1). Similarly, another 
former minister insisted that committees were ‘vastly over-rated as decision-making 
bodies’, and their work was generally ‘formal and routine’ (correspondent, 7).  
A number of our respondents also highlighted cases where committees were 
important not as institutions of collective decision-making but as instruments of 
individual ministerial control. For example, the Economic Affairs Committee chaired 
by George Osborne was important, not because it met and discussed policy—it did 
not—but because it was used by the chancellor to control policy in this area 
(interviewee, 2). During the period of coalition, the Banking Reform Committee was 
also important for a while, again not because it met and discussed policy—according 
to one of its principal members, it did not hold a single meeting (correspondent, 7)—
but because it enabled Osborne to develop an approach to the subject in conjunction 
with Vince Cable (interviewee, 4).  
Another point to emerge from the feedback we received was that context 
mattered enormously. As one former minister put it, some committees were ‘more 
important at some times than others [and] even each committee fluctuates’, making it 
‘hard to meaningfully quantify’, and ‘probably inadvisable to do so’ (correspondent, 
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5). Some committees undoubtedly carried more weight in the early part of the 
coalition government precisely because there was a coalition. The Home Affairs 
Committee during this period was ‘a powerful and important decision-making 
committee with real checks and balances’, because it served as means of structuring 
inter-party discussion over a broad swathe of public policy (interviewee, 1). As the 
relationship between the two parties deteriorated, the committee’s value diminished, 
and it ‘came to be seen as a constraint by Conservatives and thus an object of dislike’ 
(interviewee, 4). After 2015, the committee ‘no longer mattered’ (interviewee, 2). 
The implications of this variety are clear: categorising a committee’s influence 
without paying attention to what it actually does leads to measures that bear little 
resemblance to a committee’s practical importance. To illustrate this point, in 
November 2013 three committees obtained the highest possible weighted score of 
100: the Coalition Committee, the NSC and the Public Expenditure Committee. Yet, 
the first essentially existed on paper, and the last made no policy but existed simply 
‘to bash departments into submission at relevant moments in relevant spending 
rounds’ (interviewee, 2). Only the NSC performed anything akin to a policy-making 
role. All three committees, however, had the same weight according to Dunleavy’s 
measures. 
An alternative indicator of committee importance that several respondents 
suggested was whether on or not a committee was chaired by the prime minister. In 
Dunleavy’s original framework, the proportion of members of cabinet rank 
determined the weighted score of a committee or sub-committee. But while the 
presence of key ministers could well signal importance, prime ministerial 
participation was a virtual guarantee of it. Certainly, Cameron’s presence on a 
committee usually indicated that it was likely to be an important forum, and 
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attendance at committees was usually much greater when he took the chair. As one 
former minister said about the weighted scores for prime ministerial committees, ‘I’d 
probably give a rocket boost to it for attendance of the PM, which I think hugely 
raises the stakes’ (interviewee, 1).  
 
Apportioning committee influence 
The second aspect of Dunleavy’s measures on which we sought feedback was how 
committees’ weighted scores were subsequently divided. Did insiders agree that all 
members should automatically be given an equal share, and chairs and deputy chairs 
an extra share? 
The answer was generally ‘no’. Although chairs and deputy chairs were 
reckoned to have some additional influence (interviewee, 1), the role of committee 
chair was ‘not a prism through which power was articulated’. Assuming they had 
twice the influence was ‘bogus’ (interviewee, 4). Instead, according to one former 
minister, the influence of chairs varies on ‘a case by case basis’ and depends on 
informal rules, in particular ‘who has the ear of the PM, who has relations with who 
else’ (interviewee, 2). He reckoned that the prime minister enjoyed ‘90 percent of 
influence’ on the National Security Council, Nick Clegg enjoyed ‘50 percent’ on the 
Home Affairs Committee and George Osborne ‘20 percent’ on the Scotland 
Committee. At the same time, some chairs were more influential than others as a 
result of their approach to the role. While some chairs would do their homework, 
‘There are some who’d just look at the brief when they get in the room and make a 
complete dog’s dinner of it’ (interviewee, 3). 
The same factors that affected the influence of chairs and deputy chairs on a 
committee also affected the relative influence of individual members. Some ministers 
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were taken more seriously because of their office and who they were, others because 
of their close relationship with the prime minister, and yet others because of their 
standing in the party. Again, some ministers could have greater influence because of 
their mastery, and acknowledged mastery, of policy. Oliver Letwin, for example, was 
known to be Cameron’s agent in the committee system but he was also known for his 
expertise: in meetings, it was clear that he ‘was the type of person who [had] thought 
about everything … and came up with some sensible ideas’ (interviewee, 3). Many 
ministers, in contrast, were there to make up the numbers and ‘might contribute 
absolutely nothing’ (interviewee, 3). Some senior ministers never bothered to attend 
meetings. 
At the same time, ministers differed in their willingness to speak out on areas 
outside of their immediate area of responsibility (Laws, 2016: 191). Theresa May 
(interviewee, 3) and Amber Rudd (interviewee, 2) were cited as ministers who tended 
to stick to their own departmental briefs, whereas Michael Gove (interviewee 1), 
George Osborne (interviewee, 3) and Philip Hammond (interviewee, 2) were cited as 
ministers who ranged more widely. Attributing equal potential influence to every 
member of the same committee was deeply problematic.  
 
The scores’ accuracy 
The final and perhaps most important aspect of Dunleavy’s measures on which we 
sought feedback was their overall accuracy. Did insiders find the scores and rankings 
plausible? 
In practice, not one of our respondents regarded the scores and rankings (see 
Table 1) as precise indicators of actual ministerial influence. One rejected their 
plausibility outright with a simple ‘no’ (correspondent, 4), and another with an 
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equally simple ‘not really’ (correspondent, 8). Yet another former minister who 
examined the rankings from October 2012 said: ‘No one in their right mind would 
recognise this list’ (interviewee, 4). Some respondents qualified their rejection of the 
results. For one former minister, the scores were plausible to ‘some (v. limited) 
extent’ but also ‘overly simplistic’ (correspondent, 5). For another, the initial rankings 
in May 2010 seemed ‘broadly sensible’ at first glance, but he began to quibble various 
rankings upon closer inspection and came to the view that ‘it doesn’t look right’ 
(interviewee, 1). Nor did longitudinal changes in the scores always make sense to our 
respondents. One minister who attended cabinet from 2010 to 2016 rejected the 
suggestion that Theresa May was more influential after 2015, even though her ranking 
went up from thirteenth in December 2014 to third in July 2015 (interviewee, 2). 
Insofar as the scores and rankings seemed plausible, it was usually because the 
more senior offices—the prime minister, the chancellor, the home secretary, the 
foreign secretary and the deputy prime minister during the coalition—were generally 
ranked towards the top. Beyond this, however, there were problems. The biggest 
problem for respondents was the relatively low ranking of the prime minister. As one 
interviewee told us, ‘You need [the] prime minister and chancellor right at the top. 
Anything that doesn’t have that, just doesn’t get what’s going on’ (interviewee, 3). 
Another simply found it ‘hilarious’ that the prime minister never topped the rankings 
(interviewee, 2). Another former minister told us the rankings were ‘not quite’ 
plausible and revised those from May 2010 and October 2012 to indicate the prime 
minister should be top (correspondent, 9). One former minister who sat in cabinet for 
most of Cameron’s premiership observed bluntly: ‘the more I think about it, the more 
convinced I am that this isn’t “research” quality’ (correspondent, 5). 
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One clear point that emerged from both our interviews and written feedback 
was the importance of informal power structures and the measures’ failure to account 
for these. During the coalition, the Quad was the most important forum for addressing 
inter-party disputes and driving the agenda. Being close to Cameron and part of his 
inner team was what mattered most for shaping policy. In this respect, as one former 
minister told us, ‘the top of government has striking similarities to the Tudor Court’ 
(correspondent, 2). Another former minister expanded on this point and how court 
politics in turn shaped the dynamics of the cabinet-committee system: 
 
[T]he power structure is best conceived of as a court. Some places are held by 
elected politicians, some by peers, some by officials. All are courtiers. In 
every committee, for example, a decision is made by the PM or at least 
allowed to be made. There is a positive decision to allow it.  The PM can look 
at minutes and if a decision is made that goes against what he wants, the 
decision can be re-run, or, if not, re-written… Court membership is what 
matters. (interviewee, 2) 
 
Needless to say, the measures neglected these factors, both in their assumptions and 
results. 
 
Discussion 
David Cameron’s premiership began and ended in unusual circumstances. Like all 
prime ministers, he was able to shape the character and practice of collective decision-
making (King, 1991; Heffernan, 2003). During his time in office, Cameron 
established a relatively small number of cabinet committees, certainly when compared 
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to his immediate predecessors. Most committees coordinated, discussed or chased 
decisions made elsewhere. Only a few ever functioned as deliberative decision-
making forums. Even during the period of coalition, when committees had been 
expected to play a bigger role, they tended to ratify and process policy decisions made 
in departments or by the inner Downing Street circle (see Clegg, 2016: 78-79; Laws, 
2016: 509-510; Clarke, 2016: 451). 
Cameron may have tolerated discussion and promoted collegiality, but he had 
no apparent wish to revitalise Clement Attlee’s style of government built around a 
powerful cabinet-committee system. Moreover, while Cameron took a leading role in 
the National Security Council, other ministers handled the formalities of the system’s 
domestic work. George Osborne kept a tight grip on economic policy by effectively 
neutering the Economic Affairs Committee, while Nick Clegg and later Oliver Letwin 
managed the coordination of domestic policy through the Home Affairs Committee. 
Where does all this leave Dunleavy’s positional-influence measures? In one 
sense their value is clearly limited. Our respondents did not reckon the scores and 
rankings to be particularly accurate, while the measures omitted crucial informal 
factors that shaped ministers’ capacity to influence decisions. Our respondents also 
said they overstated the importance of the committee system as a forum for decision-
making. More generally, as one former minister put it, cabinet committees had ‘no or 
vanishingly little connection to power’ (interview evidence, 2). 
Of course, our respondents might simply have misunderstood the purpose of 
the measures. They might not have been thinking about influence in the specific and 
narrow context of the cabinet-committee system. They might even have 
underestimated the actual importance of committees. Set against this, however, is the 
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certainty with which they rejected the scores. The weight of insider opinion was 
persuasive. 
At the same time, the scores unintentionally demonstrated some utility as a 
heuristic for exploring intra-executive power dynamics, insofar as they facilitated 
discussions with those who had direct experience of the top of government. A number 
of our interviewees and respondents took the time and effort to engage with the 
measures and indicate who, in their opinion, should have received higher or lower 
scores. As a basic approach, such conversations can be extremely fruitful, especially 
when researchers are told that such and such a minister had very little influence, or so 
and so was actually very influential behind closed doors. Nevertheless, we suspect 
that such conversations could be prompted just as well by simpler measures, such as 
the number of committees that ministers chaired, or the number of committees on 
which they sat.  
In general, our findings are probably best described as a series of cautionary 
tales about applying objective measures to something as concealed and dynamic as 
influence within government. In this respect, Converse’s (1964: 206) doctrine ‘that 
what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not 
important to study’ might have been written about power in the core executive.  
If we wish to explore cabinet committees as institutions in their own right, 
published lists can only be a starting point. As those we spoke to made clear, there is 
enormous variation in the role, remit and importance of committees. This variation 
merits systematic empirical analysis, and the kind of data that can only be gathered 
through in-depth elite interviews. Students of government still have much to do in 
terms of distinguishing between forms and functions, and developing appropriate 
categories.  
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Published lists of cabinet committees may also be useful as a starting point for 
exploring other aspects of government. As we have demonstrated, they can serve as a 
starting point for engaging with ministers and officials and talking about influence. 
We also think they could be used as basis for exploring how individual ministers are 
networked with one another, as one of our respondents suggested (interviewee, 2). 
Published lists could even potentially be used as a basis for exploring the changing 
‘policy agenda’ of the core executive (John et al., 2013). It is clear, simply from 
eyeballing successive lists of cabinet committees, that the system is responsive to 
what happens outside (as well as within) government. As new issues arise that require 
inter-departmental coordination, so new committees are created. The number of 
committees in which departments are represented is thus likely to tell us something 
about the contemporary priorities of collective decision-making structures. Again, 
such information could only be a starting point for analysis, but it could nonetheless 
help to advance our knowledge and understanding of Britain’s core executive. 
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Notes 
1 The equal share was calculated by dividing the committee’s weighted influence 
score by N+1, where N was the total membership. The division by N+1 was necessary 
because of the chair’s double share. 
2 As one respondent told us, the distinction between ministers who are full members 
and ministers who merely attend cabinet was one that, in practice, ‘doesn’t mean very 
much’ (interviewee, 1). 
3 We also calculated post-2015 scores excluding the memberships of implementation 
task forces. The scores and rankings were not fundamentally different. 
4 Although the new post-election committee system was first detailed in a list 
published in June 2015, the information was updated less than a month later with the 
addition of the Economic Affairs Committee’s Airports Sub-Committee. Because of 
their proximity, we analysed the later July list.  
5 Some of this information could be established by consulting official minutes in the 
National Archives. But individual ministers’ positions are generally not recorded, and 
the minutes relevant to our study will not be released for many years. 
6 Those we interviewed included three former ministers and a very senior official. The 
three former ministers were all members of the coalition-era ‘sextet’ (Grice, 2012) 
and included at least one representative from each of the parties. The interviews were 
conducted on a non-attributable basis. The sacrifice in transparency was offset by the 
opportunity to speak to a number of figures with intimate knowledge of the Cameron-
era cabinet-committee system. 
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FIGURE 1: The cabinet-committee system, May 2010 
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FIGURE 2: The cabinet-committee system, July 2015 
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FIGURE 3: The changing number of cabinet committees, 2010–2016  
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TABLE 1: Top-twenty rankings of ministerial influence (standardised influence scores) 
 May 2010  October 2012  December 2014  July 2015 
1 George Osborne (8.6%) 
Chancellor  
1 George Osborne (8.3%) 
Chancellor 
1 George Osborne (6.9%) 
Chancellor 
1 Oliver Letwin (8.1%) 
Duchy of Lancaster 
2 Nick Clegg* (6.3%) 
Deputy prime minister  
2 Danny Alexander* (7.2%) 
Chief secretary 
2 Danny Alexander* (6.4%) 
Chief secretary 
2 George Osborne (5.0%) 
Chancellor 
3 David Cameron (6.1%) 
Prime minister 
3 Oliver Letwin (5.6%) 
Cabinet Office minister 
3 Oliver Letwin (6.3%) 
Cabinet Office minister  
3 Theresa May (4.8%) 
Home secretary 
=4 Oliver Letwin (6.0%) 
Cabinet Office minister 
4 William Hague (5.5%) 
Foreign secretary 
4 David Cameron (5.7%)  
Prime minister 
4 David Cameron (4.7%)  
Prime minister 
=4 Chris Huhne* (6.0%) 
Energy secretary  
5 David Cameron (4.8%) 
Prime minister 
5 Nick Clegg* (5.5%) 
Deputy prime minister 
5 Greg Clark (4.3%) 
Communities secretary   
6 Danny Alexander* (5.9%) 
Scottish secretary 
6 Francis Maude (4.6%) 
Paymaster general 
=6 Ed Davey* (4.2%) 
Energy secretary 
6 Greg Hands (4.2%) 
Chief secretary 
7 William Hague (5.7%) 
Foreign secretary 
7 Vince Cable* (4.5%) 
Business secretary 
=6 William Hague (4.2%) 
Leader of Commons 
7 Matthew Hancock (3.8%) 
Paymaster general 
8 David Laws* (5.4%)  
Chief secretary  
8 Nick Clegg* (4.4%) 
Deputy prime minister 
8 Francis Maude (3.7%) 
Paymaster general 
8 Sajid Javid (3.7%) 
Business secretary 
9 Vince Cable* (5.2%) 
Business secretary 
9 Ken Clarke (4.2%) 
Minister w/o portfolio  
9 Vince Cable* (3.6%) 
Business secretary 
=9 Iain Duncan Smith (3.2%) 
Work & pensions secretary 
=10 Liam Fox (4.1%) 
Defence secretary 
10 Ed Davey* (3.9%) 
Energy secretary 
=10 Eric Pickles (3.6%)  
Communities secretary 
=9 Philip Hammond (3.2%) 
Foreign secretary 
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=10 Theresa May (4.1%) 
Home secretary 
11 David Laws* (3.7%) 
Education minister 
=10 Philip Hammond (3.4%)  
Foreign secretary 
11 Chris Grayling (2.8%) 
Leader of Commons 
12 Eric Pickles (3.2%) 
Communities secretary 
12 Theresa May (3.0%) 
Home secretary 
12 David Laws* (3.3%) 
Education minister 
12 Michael Gove (2.1%) 
Lord chancellor 
13 Iain Duncan Smith (3.0%) 
Work & pensions secretary 
13 Philip Hammond (2.7%)  
Defence secretary 
13 Theresa May (2.8%) 
Home secretary 
13 Mark Harper (2.0%) 
Commons chief whip  
14 Ken Clarke (2.6%) 
Lord chancellor 
14 Eric Pickles (2.3%)  
Communities secretary  
=14 Liz Truss (2.5%) 
Environment secretary  
14 Michael Fallon (1.9%) 
Defence secretary 
15 Francis Maude (2.4%) 
Paymaster general 
=15 Michael Moore* (2.2%) 
Scottish secretary 
=14 Michael Fallon (2.5%) 
Defence secretary  
=15 Nicky Morgan (1.8%) 
Education secretary 
16 Andrew Mitchell (1.9%) 
Int. development secretary 
=15 Lord Green (2.2%) 
Trade minister 
=16 Patrick McLoughlin (2.2%) 
Transport secretary 
=15 Lizz Truss (1.8%) 
Environment secretary 
17 Philip Hammond (1.8%) 
Transport secretary 
17 Michael Gove (2.0%) 
Education secretary 
=16 Michael Gove (2.2%) 
Commons chief whip  
=15 Alun Cairns (1.8%) 
Welsh secretary 
18 B. Warsi (1.4%) 
Minister w/o portfolio 
18 Iain Duncan Smith (1.6%) 
Work & pensions secretary 
=18 Iain Duncan Smith (2.0%) 
Work & pensions secretary 
=18 Jeremy Hunt (1.7%)  
Health secretary 
=19 Mark Hoban (1.3%)  
Financial secretary 
=19 Owen Patterson (1.5%) 
Environment secretary 
=18 Nicky Morgan (2.0%) 
Education secretary 
=18 Amber Rudd (1.7%) 
Energy secretary  
=19 B. Neville-Jones (1.3%)  
Minister for security  
=19 Maria Miller (1.5%)  
Culture secretary 
20 Sajid Javid (1.9%) 
Culture secretary 
20 David Mundell (1.6%)  
Scottish secretary  
Note: *Liberal Democrat ministers. The standardised scores are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
